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What Hath Patterson Wrought? A
Study in the Failure to Understand
the Employment Contract
Mack A. Player*
FloridaState University College of Law
Tallahassee,Florida

I. Introduction
A. The Nature of Section 1981
One portion of the broad and sweeping civil rights legislation
enacted in 1866, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, provides: "All
persons... shall have the same right.., to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." For 100 years it was
assumed that this section, as other similar sections in the same Act,
was directed at "state" or governmental infringements on the right
to contract, and did not address discriminatory refusals to contract
between private individuals.1 That assumption was laid to rest in
Runyon v. McCrary.2 The 1866 Civil Rights Act, of which 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 was a part, prohibits purely private discrimination in the
3
making and enforcement of contracts.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the employment relationship was "contractual" in nature. Consequently,
the refusal to hire and the termination of employment on racial
grounds was denying the "right to make contracts as enjoyed by
white citizens," and violated section 1981. 4 Section 1981, however,
because of its roots in the thirteenth amendment, is limited to claims
of "racial" discrimination. 5 The Act does not regulate racially neu* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law, A.B., Drury College,
1962; J.D., University of Missouri, 1965; LL.M., George Washington University, 1972.
1. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948).
2. 427 U.S. 160, 168-70 (1976).
3. Id.
4. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of

Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
5. It protects not only blacks against racial discrimination, but also whites
against discrimination because of their white race, according to the same standards
as are applied to blacks. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 287-

296. Moreover, under this Act "race" is not limited to the current "scientific" division
of races into three or four major categories (e.g., Caucasian, Negroid, Mongoloid), but
includes that conception of race prevailing in the midnineteenth century when Congress enacted the statute. At that time "ancestry" or "ethnic characteristics" were
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tral factors imposed in good faith merely because of the impact of
those factors on a particular race; rather, section 1981 reaches only
actions motivated by racial considerations. 6 Improper motive need
not be ill-will or animus directed toward a racial class. Use of race,
7
even benignly, in making contract decisions falls within the Act.
The 1866 Civil Rights Act has been a popular and effective remedy for racial discrimination for a number of reasons. The Act has
no coverage limitations, and thus unlike Title VII, which requires
for coverage fifteen employees for twenty calendar weeks,8 section
1981 will apply to contract discrimination regardless of the size of
the entity or number of employees.9 Title VII is limited to the "employment relationship"; discrimination in other contractual relationships is outside the scope of that Act.' 0 Suits under section 1981
require only the refusal to enter a contractual relationship. Consequently, a claim will be stated even where the contractual relationship refused is not strictly an employment relationship." The 1866
2
Act has no administrative prerequisites to suit,' a complicated pro3
cess that has plagued Title VII litigants. Compared to Title VII, the
defined as "races." English, Irish, Mexicans, Poles, Scandinavians, Germans, Basques,
Jews, and Gypsies were specifically mentioned by the 1866 Congress as being distinct
races. Thus, it is racial discrimination to discriminate against a person because of
ancestry or ethnicity, that is, discriminate because he is Oriental, Hispanic, PolishAmerican, middle-eastern, Jewish, etc. St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S.
604, 611 (1987); Share Tefila Congregationv. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). The Act does
not protect, however, against discrimination based on national origin or citizenship.
Bhandari v. First National Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc). Thus, it will not violate section 1981 to discriminate against someone because
he is not a U.S. citizen. But it will violate the Act to discriminate against the person
because he was of Swedish ethnic origin.
6. GeneralBuilding ContractorsAss'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
7. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b). For a brief discussion of coverage, see Player, Employment DiscriminationLaw, 204-20 (West, 1988).
9. Carterv. Duncan-Huggins,Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
10. Darks v. Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1984); Lutcher v. Musicians
Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337
(11th Cir. 1982); Garrettv. PhillipsMills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1983).
11. T & S Service Associates v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1981); Mullen v.
PrincessAnne Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1988).
12. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. at 454.
13. For an overview of Title VII procedures, see Player, Employment Discrimination Law, 470-90 (West 1988). As an illustration of the complexity see Love v.
Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972) (referral of charge to state agency a filing); Mohasco v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) (filing with EEOC after referral from state); EEOC v.
Commercial Office Products, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988) (termination of state jurisdiction); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983) (period in which to
file following right to sue notice); Ezell v. Mobile Housing Bd., 709 F.2d 1376 (11th
Cir. 1983) (failure of class member to file charge); Clark v. Coates & Clark, 865 F.2d
1237 (11 th Cir. 1989) (content of charge); Purdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690
F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1982) (failure of EEOC to grant right to sue letter); St. Louis v.
Alverno College, 744 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1984) (receipt of notice of right to sue).
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1866 Act allows relatively long periods in which to file suit. 14 Perhaps the most significant reason plaintiffs use section 1981 is the
availability of compensatory and, where appropriate, punitive damages,1 5 a remedy that is not available to a Title VII plaintiff., 6 Finally,
unlike Title VII, parties to a section 1981 action seeking the legal
17
relief of damages, upon timely demand, can secure a trial by jury.
B. The Patterson Holding
The primary issue that petitioner brought before the Supreme
Court in Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union' was the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion that harassment of a black worker by the employer was
not the denial of a contract, and thus not protected by 42 U.S.C. §
1981.19 The Court, however, decided to revisit the very premise of
section 1981 liability. After initial argument the Court ordered the
parties to brief and argue the issue of whether section 1981 reached
private employment contracts. More specifically, should the Court
overrule Runyon v. McCrary?20 This direction caused tremors
throughout the civil rights litigation community.
After creating this stir the year before, the Court ended up unanimously, albeit somewhat reluctantly, reaffirming the basic premise
of Runyon; private racial discrimination in the contractual, and thus
14. As section 1981 has no specified limitation period, and there is no analogous
federal statute of limitation, the time to file the section 1981 complaint will be governed by the law of the state in which the action is filed. While the claim under section
1981 is premised on the denial of a contract, the injury for that denial is a personal
injury. Consequently, the federal courts will apply the state limitations applicable to
personal injury actions. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-62 (1987).
Obviously this period will differ from state to state. Nonetheless, the limitation set
by the state may not single out civil rights actions and assign a limitation period so
short that it undermines the substantive federal right. See generally Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984) (six-month period for filing EEO race discrimination charges
with state agency is inappropriate and shall not govern section 1981 complaints).
15. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. at 454; Harrisv. Richards
Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 811, 814-15 (6th Cir. 1982); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832
F.2d 194, 204-05 (1 st Cir. 1987); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F. 2d 1431, 1435 (11 th Cir.
1985); Poolaw v. Anadarko, 738 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1984).
16. Shah v. Mount Zion Hospital& Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981);
Claibornev. Illinois CentralRy., 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978).
17. Harrisv. RichardsMfg. Co., 675 F.2d 811,814-15 (6th Cir. 1982); Sester v.
Novack Investment Co., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1981); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 1987).
Although there is no provision in section 1981 for a successful plaintiff to recover
attorney fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows for recovery of attorney fees under section
1981. Fees will be awarded according to the same terms and conditions as are available
to a Title VII litigant. Compare ChristiansburgGarment Co. v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (Title VII standard for awarding attorney fees) with Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (section 1988 attorney
fees, using same standard).
18. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
19. 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986).
20. 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
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employment, relationship continues to2 state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981; "state action" is not required. '
However, as to the issue originally presented to the Courtclaims of racial harassment under section 1981-the Court affirmed
the court of appeals, holding that the trial court correctly withheld
the plaintiff's section 1981 claim of racial harassment from jury
consideration. The five-justice majority reads the language of section
1981, "to make," quite literally[to] extend[] only to the formation of a contract, but not to problems
that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employment.
The statute prohibits, when based on race, the refusal to enter into
a contract with someone, as well as the offer to make a contract
only on discriminatory terms. But the right to make contracts does
not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by
the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions. Such postformation conduct does not
involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance of established contract obligations and the conditions of
continuing employment, matters more naturally governed by state
contract law and Title VII.22

The Court then turned to the "to enforce" language in section
1981. In a similarly crabbed construction, the Court held that "to
enforce contracts" applies to "private efforts to impede access to
courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about
the force of binding obligations, as well as discrimination by private
'23
entities, such as labor unions, in enforcing terms of a contract.
The Act, thus, does not reach discriminatory "enforcement" by a
party to the contract who simply discriminates in the application of
general contractual terms.
The plaintiff's claim also alleged denial of a requested promotion
based on race. As to this claim the Court held:
Petitioner's claim that respondent violated § 1981 by failing to promote her, because of race,

. . .

is a different matter .... Consistent

with what we have said ...the question upon whether a promotion
claim is actionable under § 1981 depends upon whether the nature
of the change in position was such that it involved the opportunity
to enter into a new contract with the employer. If so, then the employer's refusal to enter the new contract is actionable under § 1981.24

21.
22.
23.
24.

109 S. Ct. at 2369-72.
109 S. Ct. at 2373.
Id.
109 S.Ct. at 2377.
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II. Critique of Patterson: The Nature of
"The Contract" as a Guide for Resolving
Future Issues
The Court's ratio decidendi, based on a premise that section
1981 protections "only extend to the formation of a contract," and
thus do not apply to "postformation conduct," is, of course, a grudging construction of a civil rights statute, when such statutes generally are construed with a liberal spirit to reach the intent of the
drafters. 25 But even if Justice Kennedy is correct in his reading of
the statutory phrase "same right to make a contract, ' 26 his application of that statutory principle displays, at best, a simplistic view
of the contractual underpinnings of the employment relationship.
Basic contract analysis teaches that an employment relationship
is not, as Justice Kennedy surmised, a single, monolithic contractual
relationship that continues uninterrupted from the initial hiring until the point the employer-employee relationship is severed. If Justice Kennedy had looked at the relationship more closely he would
have seen that the relationship is a series of distinct contractual
undertakings. When the employer offers a job at a stated consideration, this is an offer for a unilateral contract, a promise that is
accepted by the employee's commencing performance. 27 Contracts,
however, must have a termination date, i.e., a point at which performance is complete. The parties may set a fixed period, as is common in academic circles. After this period is completed a new offer
is tendered or not by the employer, with the employee having the
option of rejecting or accepting any offer of another period of employment. 2 Or, as is often the case, as in Patterson,the parties are
25. See Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).

26. The attack on Justice Kennedy's construction of section 1981, its history,
and its purpose is well stated in the dissent of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 109 S.Ct. at 2379 (Brennan, J. dissenting). That
dissent, which goes largely to the majority's construction of the statute, is seconded,
but will not be reviewed. Perhaps the most glaring flaw in the Court's analysis is the
Court's reliance on the existence of Title VII remedies as a rationale to limit the scope
of section 1981. 109 S.Ct. at 2374-75. The Court seems to forget that section 1981 is
applicable to all contracts, many of which fall outside the employment relationship
protected by Title VII. Thus, racial discrimination in an educational relationship, at
least in entering into the contract (admission to the school), states a claim under
section 1981. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160. But given the Court's
conclusion that postcontractual conduct is not covered by section 1981, presumably
a child, after admission could be segregated, humiliated, harassed, insulted, belittled,
and otherwise abused by school officials without officials being liable under section
1981. May a landlord, who is required by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 to rent property
on a racially neutral basis (see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968))
rent to black families but thereafter harass these tenants in the hope of driving them
to other lodgings?
27. Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 32, 50 (1981).
28. See Johnson v. Chapel Hill Ind. School Dist., 853 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1988).
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silent as to the duration of the contract. In such cases the courts
imply that the period understood by the parties was a "reasonable"
time, often determined implicitly by the period of time that the parties have set for the payment of the employee's salary (weekly, biweekly, monthly, etc.) or that the parties deem necessary to complete
a particular task. As is the case of employment for a fixed term,
upon completion of the performance for the period of time implicitly
contemplated by the parties (week, bi-week, month, semester, or job)
the employee is entitled to the compensation promised for past per29
formance. At this point the contract has been performed.
To continue the employment relationship a new contract must
be formed. This is accomplished by the employer offering the position and consideration which will be accepted implicitly by the employee commencing work. The employer's silence upon the
commencement of each new period may, through tradition, be construed as an offer of employment for a like period under similar
terms as performed in the immediate past period. Nonetheless, because a new offer is being implied, the employer remains free at the
commencement of any period to overcome this implication by expressly withholding the offer of continued employment (e.g., "you
are fired"). Or the employer may offer the job under different terms
(e.g., "you are being reassigned," or, "your pay will be cut"). 30 Similarly, the employee is free to reject or accept any offer of employment, expressed or implied, either by tendering or not tendering the
performance that would signify acceptance of the employer's offer
(e.g., showing up for work). If the offer is not made, or if made, not
accepted, no contract is formed. But once the offer is made and
accepted by the employee commencing work, a new and distinct
31
contract is formed between the parties.
29. 3A Corbin on Contracts §§ 676-84 (1951), Supplement Part I (Kaufman ed.
1988), particularly § 683; C. Bakaly & J. Grossman, Modern Law of Employment
Contracts, ch. 3 (1983, 1988 Supp.), particularly § 3.3.1.
For illustrative cases, see, e.g., Tipton v. CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce,
872 F.2d 1491, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1989); Page v. CarolinaCouch Co., 667 F.2d 1156,
1158 (4th Cir. 1982); Harper v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 244 N.W.2d 782, 788
(1976); Priorv. Briggs Mfg. Co., 312 Mich. 476, 20 N.W.2d 279, 282 (1945); Pubnam
v. Producers Live Stock Mktg. Ass'n, 256 Ky. 196, 75 S.W.2d 1075 (1934); Moline
Lumber Co. v. Harrison,128 Ark. 269, 194 S.W. 25 (1917); Pollack v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 131 A.D. 628, 131 N.Y.S. 386 (1911).
See generally, Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contractsin the
United States and England, 5 Comp. Lab. L. 85 (1982).
30. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-73 (1908). See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 31 (1981). See also, J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 56-62 (3d
Ed. 1987); W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 425 (Bell, ed. 1771).
31. Or the parties can be reversed, to the same effect. The employee could be
considered the offeror when she applies for a vacancy, offering to work on the terms
articulated by the employer in announcing the vacancy. The employer accepts the
offer by employing the applicant. The terms are implicitly set by express understand-
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As Justice Stevens noted in concurrence, "[an at-will employee,
such as petitioner, is not merely performing an existing contract,
she is constantly remaking that contract. '32 Indeed, it is the concept
of recurring discrete contracts that serves as the conceptual underpinning of the "employment at-will" notion, a notion that allows
either party without liability, prospectively to end the relationship.
It is because each period is deemed to be a new contractual under"at-will" to refuse
taking that the employer and the employee are 33
to enter the relationship for a future like period.
Thus, notwithstanding the superficial continuity of the employment relationship that beguiled the Court into assuming that employment is a single contract, in the contemplation of contract law
an ongoing employment relationship consists of a chain of distinct
contracts; each new period of the ongoing relationship implicitly
produces a new offer of continued employment that is accepted anew
by the employee commencing work. The easily identified initial entry date and the obvious point where the relationship ends may make
the employment relationship look like a single contract. Indeed, the
internal lines of contractual demarcation that break this apparently
monolithic relationship into discrete contractual units may not be
clear. But the lines are there, nonetheless.
The Court's cramped view that section 1981 did not reach "postformation conduct" thus did not alone produce the conclusion that
working conditions are not within the scope of section 1981. The
Court's view of section 1981, coupled with the simplistic idea that
the entire employment relationship was but a single contract, resulted in the conclusion that changing employment terms during the
employment relationship does not state a claim. Even with its
cramped view that section 1981 reaches only discriminatory formation of contracts, had the Court at least been willing to recognize
that the employment relationship is a recurring series of distinct
"formations," the Court would have reached the conclusion that
most changes in working conditions indeed involve discrimination
in the "formation" of the contract. When, at the beginning of any
ing or tradition which is implicitly understood. If payment is to be made periodically,
say monthly, the offer of the employee is to work for a month, and the employer's
hiring is an acceptance. Nonetheless, the employee is free not to make a similar offer
at the beginning of the next period, and the employer is free to reject any offer that
is made. See C. Bakaly & J. Grossman, Modern Law of Employment Contracts ch. 3

(1983 & 1988 supp.)
32. Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J. concurring

in part, dissenting in part).
33. Blades, Employment At Will v. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967); Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern Employment at Will Rule, 51

U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 189 (1983).
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discrete employment period, the employer offers employment on
terms that are different according to race from the terms offered
other employees, it is failing to make, or refusing to enter, a contract
on racially neutral terms. Such discriminatory terms, including a
hostile environment, are being offered for the upcoming employment
period. If these terms are not part of the white employee's contractual terms, then this is not postcontractual discrimination as the
Court assumed, but is discrimination in the "making" of the contract
for the next contractual period. It makes no difference that the initial
contract between the parties' terms were offered on a nondiscriminatory basis. If, for the upcoming period, the terms now being offered are offered on a racially discriminatory basis, then a section
34
1981 claim should lie.
While the Court's analysis, as applied to the facts, is an extremely narrow view of the contractual nature of the employment
relationship, the holding on the facts, nonetheless, is clear. It is a
holding we must live with until the Court recognizes and corrects
its error; simple harassment or discriminatory allocation of working
conditions to current employees is outside the protection of section
1981. But given the Court's less than complete analysis of the contractual relationship involved, the decision should be limited to its
holding. Moreover, while the application of section 1981 to hiring
discrimination remains firm, because the Court's analysis does not
reflect contractual reality, it leaves unclear the application of section
1981 to four other categories of discrimination: promotion, discharge, compensation, and retaliation.
As might be expected, the lower courts have reached different
constructions of Patterson.The weight of authority appears to construe Pattersonbroadly, far beyond its holding or its language, to
the point that many courts seem to view section 1981 as protecting
nothing more than discriminatory hiring. These decisions are marked
by surprisingly little analysis of either section 1981 or Patterson.
The Ninth Circuit in Overby v. Chevron, USA 35 seems to read Patterson to eliminate from the scope of section 1981 discrimination
specifically covered by Title VII. Title VII prohibits retaliation for
filing EEOC charges. 36 Consequently, the court reasons, section 1981
is not applicable to discharges based on an employee's filing EEOC
34. Thus, in an employment for a fixed period-like an academic contractaltered conditions during that term would not, given the Court's construction of section 1981, be discrimination in formation of the contract. In such cases the discrimination would continue to be midterm. However, in contracts "at-will," which by their
nature are short term, recurring contracts, altering working conditions beginning with
each new term, would be considered discrimination in regard to entry.
35. 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1989).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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charges. This reading seems to ignore what Patterson in fact said
about the "to enforce" provisions of section 1981.37 The Sixth Circuit
in an unreported decision simply concludes, again without analysis,
and presumably with no precedential effect, that Pattersonteaches
that section 1981 is not applicable to discharges.3 s A number of disat best is
trict courts, again either with no analysis or analysis 3that
9
incoherent, agree with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion.
The Fifth Circuit recently held that harassment ultimately resulting in the employee resigning did not state a section 1981 claim
for constructive discharge. 40 This article will attempt to illustrate
4
the error of such shallow readings of Patterson.'
Two promotion cases carried Patterson to an extreme not even
remotely justified by the Court's holding. 42 They held that section
1981 does not apply to a denial of a promotion to a facially different
job involving new responsibilities and higher pay. For reasons set
37. See Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 633 (D.
Colo. 1989), which held, somewhat ironically, that while racially premised harassment
that included a demotion did not state a section 1981 claim, such harassment and
demotion would state a claim if premised on the employee complaining about racial
discrimination directed against him. In this regard, the court relied upon the "right
to enforce" language of section 1981.
38. Singleton v. Kellogg Co., 1989 Lexis U.S. App. 17920, mem. 890 F.2d 417
(6th Cir. 1989).
39 See, e.g., Jones v. ANR Freight Systems, 1990 Lexis 501 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 12,
1990), in which Judge Kocoras held that section 1981 applies only to contract formation, and not to "contract termination," and that discharge is a "termination." This
is a curious analysis of an "at-will" relationship. Judge Kocoras reasons further that
an employer's reinstatement of the former employee on discriminatory grounds is not
a contract formation within the meaning of section 1981, but rather constitutes "continuity" of the previous "termination." Reinstatement is a continuation of termination!
Judge Kocoras obviously was not going to allow logic to interfere with his denial of
plaintiff's claim. See also Alexander v. N.Y. Medical College, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1729 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Griddinev. Dillard Dep't Stores, 51 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 306 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Coleman v. Domino's Pizza, 1990 Lexis 259 (S.D.
Ala. Jan. 9, 1990); Gregory v. Harris-TeeterSuper Markets, 1990 Lexis 642 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 22, 1990); Joseph v. Zachary Manor Nursing Home, 1990 Lexis 755 (N.D. La.
Jan. 22, 1990); Goodson v. Cigna Ins. Co., 1990 Lexis 680 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1990).
40. Carrollv. GeneralAccount Accident Ins. Co., 1990 U.S. App. Lexis 423 (Jan.
16, 1990). Accord Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 738
(Haw. 1989). The Eleventh Circuit, sua sponte and apparently without argument from
the parties, held that section 1981 would not reach retaliation by a former employer
who caused a former employee to be discharged by the plaintiff's subsequent employer. The court reasoned, with some logic, that since the contractual relationship
between the plaintiff and his former employer had been severed at the time of the
alleged retaliation took place there was no denial of a contract right by the former
employer. See Sherman v. Burke ContractingCo., 1990 U.S. App. Lexis 520 (1 lth Cir.
Jan. 16, 1990).
41. See Gamboa v. Washington, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 524 (N.D. Ill.
1989); English v. General Development Corp., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825
(N.D. Ill. 1989), which held that section 1981 is applicable to discriminatory discharges.
42. See Greggs v. Hillman DistributingCo., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 429
(S.D. Tex. 1989); Byrd v. Pyle, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 556 (D.D.C. 1989).
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forth in this article, these decisions, too, seem to be an overly enthusiastic reading of Pattersontotally unsupported by the language
43
of section 1981 or basic contract principles.
III. The Future of Patterson
A. Hiring and the Allocation of Burdens
Pattersonreaffirmed that use of racial considerations in denying
an initial contract, or the discriminatory application of terms in the
44
contract at the time of formation, will state a section 1981 claim.
Patterson also recognized that direct evidence of illegal motive is
not necessary to prove the necessary racial motive; inferences of
illegal motive would be created under the same standards of proof
45
applicable to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Under traditional disparate treatment analysis for proving improper motivation, once plaintiff proves that she possessed the basic
qualifications for a vacancy, applied, and was rejected in favor of a
person from another class, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the rejection
of the plaintiff.46 Failure of defendant to present evidence of a legitimate reason for the decision to reject the plaintiff, evidence that
would support a fact finder's concluding that the reason motivated
the action, will result in a judgment for the plaintiff. If defendant
carries the burden of presenting a legitimate reason for its rejection
of the plaintiff, then in order to prevail, plaintiff must carry the
ultimate burden of persuading the fact finder of defendant's illegal
47
motive.
The Fourth Circuit in Patterson had held that if the employer's
articulated reason for rejecting the plaintiff was that the person
actually hired was better qualified for the vacancy than was the
plaintiff, the burden returned to the plaintiff to convince the fact
finder that plaintiff was better qualified than the incumbent employee. That is, if plaintiff cannot convince the fact finder that she
43. See Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 721 (D.D.C. 1989) (construing Pattersonto preclude section 1981 claims based
on pay discrimination, at least if no new and distinct job was involved).
44. 109 S. Ct. at 2372 and 2376-77. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 363-71 (1977), which applied section 1981 to racial discrimination in hiring and
to class members who, because of the pattern of discrimination, were deterred from
seeking employment. Presumably, deterred applicants would continue to be treated
as actual applicants for purposes of class action remedies.
45. 109 S. Ct. at 2373. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1983).
46. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, at 254; United States Postal
Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); see Player, The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII DisparateTreatment Cases, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 17 (1984).
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was more qualified than the white employee who received the job,
according to the Fourth Circuit, the employer was entitled to prevail.
The Supreme Court properly rejected this analysis. 48 The Court
held that plaintiff's burden is simply to prove improper motive, to
prove that defendant's articulated reason was merely a pretext. This
may be accomplished in many ways. Certainly, evidence that plaintiff was more qualified than the employee awarded the job is relevant to, if not conclusive evidence of, the pretextual nature of the
defendant's proffered reason. 49 But, even if that relative superiority
is not proved by plaintiff, plaintiff may still be able to prove the
50 °
pretextual nature of defendant's reason through other evidence
and pretext is the only fact that plaintiff must prove. "[Plaintiff]
may not be forced to pursue any particular means5 of demonstrating
that [defendant's] stated reasons are pretextual." '
52
Title VII models used in "direct evidence/fixed motive" cases
53
will presumably continue to be applied in section 1981 actions.
B. Promotions
The court of appeals in Pattersonheld that "[cllaims of racially
discriminatory promotions go to the very existence and nature of
the employment contract and thus fall easily within section 1981's
protection. ' 54 Justice Kennedy thought this "somewhat overstates
the case" and thus was unwilling to concede that promotions always
state section 1981 claims. He reasoned:
[Tihe question whether a promotion claim is actionable under section
1981 depends upon whether the nature of the change in position
was such that it involved the opportunity to enter a new contract

with the employer. If so, then the employer's refusal to enter the
new contract is actionable under 1981.... Only where the promo48. 109 S. Ct. at 2378-79.
49. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See also, Player,
Applicants, Applicants in the Hall, Who's the Fairestof Them All? Comparing Qualifications Under Employment DiscriminationLaw, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 277, 290-312
(1985).

50. The Court specifically mentioned instances of racial harassment as such
evidence. 109 S. Ct. at 2378. Other evidence indicating the pretextual nature of articulated reasons has included the timing of the reason given (Locke v. Kansas City
Power & Light, 660 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 1981)); statistical showing of underrepresentation of plaintiff's class (Personv. J.S. Alberici Const. Co., 640 F.2d 916 (8th

Cir. 1981); Etzell v. Mobile Housing Bd., 709 F.2d 1276, 1382 (1 lth Cir. 1983)); statements indicating a class prejudice (Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 729

F.2d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1984)); disparate application of the reason being articulated
(Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1984)); Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983)).
51. 109 S. Ct. at 2378.
52. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
53. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1102 (8th Cir. 1988); Mullen
v. Princess Ann Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1133 (4th Cir. 1988).
54. 805 F.2d at 1145.
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tion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and employer is such a claim
actionable. .5
In spite of the Court's misgivings, given a proper analysis of the
contractual relationship, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to envision a promotion that does not "rise to the level of a new and
distinct relation." Even if we can assume that employment in a particular job is but a single employment,5 6 by definition a promotion
entails new duties, responsibilities, and loyalties, not to mention a
different, presumably higher, compensation. If the employer is under no obligation to offer this position to the plaintiff, and if the
plaintiff is under no obligation to accept the position if offered, a
new contractual relationship is being contemplated. If that new and
different contractual relationship is denied plaintiff on the basis of
race, or offered on racially discriminatory terms, a section 1981
claim is stated. Such reasoning is applicable to any job change, vertically or laterally, to any job that the employer was not under a
prior contractual obligation to offer.
This is as it must be. If an outside, nonemployee seeks, and is
denied, the distinct position the employer is seeking to fill, and this
denial is because of the outside applicant's race, clearly that denial
violates section 1981. A current employee who seeks and is denied
the same position because of race cannot have any less of a claim to
statutory protection than does an outside applicant for the position.
Perhaps the only "promotion" subject to the Pattersonexclusion
from section 1981 protection would be automatic salary increases
that come as a matter of course, subject only to the employer taking
affirmative steps to deny the increase. One example of this would
be the nearly automatic in-grade, step increases common in the civil
service, which are dependent only on satisfactory job performance.
Prior to Patterson the lower courts had uniformly applied section 1981 to racial denial of promotions. 57 There is no reason to
55. 109 S. Ct. at 2377.
56. See notes 27-33 and accompanying text, for a critique of the Court's analysis.
57. See, e.g., Gay v. Waiters & Dairy Lunchmen's Local Union No. 30, 694 F.2d
531, 536 (9th Cir. 1981); Doughertyv. Barry, 869 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Swapshire
v. Baer, 856 F.2d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 1989); Fosterv. Board of School Commissioners
of Mobile County, 872 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1989); Schwenke v. Skaggs Alpha Beta,
Inc., 858 F.2d 627, 628 (10th Cir. 1988); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390,
1395 (8th Cir. 1983); Larkin v. Pullman-StandardDiv. Pullman,Inc., 854 F.2d 1549,
1554, 1567 (1lth Cir. 1988); Gunby v. PennsylvaniaElectricCo., 840 F.2d 1108, 1115
(3d Cir. 1988); Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1988) (tenure
denial); Cowan v. PrudentialInsurance Co., 852 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1988).
Note also that section 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(e), allows employers
"to hire" on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin in those instances where sex,
religion, or national origin are "bona fide occupations." Clearly, the terms "to hire"
are applicable to promotions and lateral transfers, allowing the defense to be asserted
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believe that the Court altered this well-established law. 5 To the
extent that promotions are treated as refusals to contract, the stanto hiring cases, as outlined in
dards of proof generally applicable
59
Patterson,will be applied.
C. Discharges
1. Actual Terminations (or the Refusal to Renew)
Unlike promotions, which the Court at least addressed, the discussion of discharges is conspicuous by the Court's total silence; the
word "discharge" was not mentioned. While the analysis of the Court
could be superficially construed to exclude discharges from the scope
of the Act, 60 upon closer analysis, the Court did not and could not
have excluded discharges from the protection of section 1981.
On at least seven occasions the Court has had section 1981 discharge claims before it, and in each case the Court either held or
assumed that discharges on the basis of race fall within the protections of section 1981.61 This line of authority began with Johnson v.
Railway ExpressAgency, 62 where the Court held that pursuit of Title
in those situations. The employees are being hired into those positions. See Harrisv.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Levin v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d
1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984). There is no reason why the same broad concept of hire should
not be applicable under section 1981.
58. Cf. Griggs v. Hillman DistributingCo., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 429
(S.D. Tex. 1989), where Judge Harmon held that denying a promotion from a "sales
manager" to a "district manager" was not a "new and distinct" relationship which
stated a claim under section 1981. This ruling was made in granting defendant's motion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss plaintiff's section 1981 claim. The court was
thus holding, without any inquiry into the factual differences between the two jobs
("sales manager" and "district manager"), that, as a matter of law, the complaint
failed to state a claim. This holding is so wrong in its application of basic contract
principles, wrong in its application of even the mean spirited language of Patterson,
and wrong in the proper use of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules that the decision
needs no comment to illustrate its error. Presumably, it will be reversed on appeal.
At the very least, there was a potential factual issue of whether the "district manager"
job denied to the plaintiff because of his race was a "new and distinct" position. This
case illustrates how a narrow, mean spirited decision like Patterson can inspire and
embolden lower courts hostile to civil rights claims to emasculate even further the
rights created by the legislation.
59. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
60. A discharge, by definition, comes after the original hiring. Thus, if section
1981 does not apply to "posthiring" treatment, the argument follows that section
1981 cannot apply to discharges.
61. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 459-60 (1975); see
generally McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Delaware
State College v. Ricks, 479 U.S. 250 (1980); Burnett v. Grattin, 468 U.S. 42 (1984);
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); St. FrancisCollege v. A1-Khazraji,
107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987), all of which predated Patterson. Since Patterson,the Court
assumed, without deciding, that section 1981 covered racially discriminatory discharges. See generally Jett v. DallasInd. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
62. 421 U.S. 454 (1974).
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VII procedures for a racially premised discharge did not toll the
statute of limitations for a section 1981 claim.
Delaware State College v. Ricks 63 similarly involved the appli-

cation of a statute of limitations to a section 1981 discharge claim.
The issue was whether the limitation period began running at the
last day of employment or when the employee was unequivocally
informed of the employer's decision to terminate the relationship.
Obviously, there would have been no need to reach this issue if
terminations were not within the scope of section 1981.64
The seminal case, however, is McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
TransportationCo. 65 The Court was faced with the specific issue of
whether a discharge of a white worker for theft, while retaining an
equally guilty black worker, stated a claim under section 1981. A
basic argument of the employer was that whites are not protected
by the 1866 Act. The Court held that section 1981 prohibitions against
race discrimination were equally applicable to all races, and thus a
racially premised discharge violated section 1981.
This premise was unambiguously reaffirmed in St. FrancisCollege v. AI-Khazraji.6 6 An Iraqi was denied reappointment as a professor, and the employer denied liability on the grounds that there
was no discrimination that could be described as "racial." The Court
disagreed, and held that discriminatory refusal to retain the Iraqi

63. 479 U.S. 250 (1980).

64. This case illustrates also the conceptual difficulty of distinguishing between
a discharge and a refusal to offer continued employment. Was the professor denied a
position for the next school year being discharged, or was the employer refusing to
hire the teacher? Contractually it makes no difference. The individual was not being
offered a job for the next period of employment. The Court held that the employer's
unequivocal statement that the employee would not be retained triggered the statutory
time period. This supports the idea that a discharge of an employee is identical to the
decision not to hire an applicant.
See also Burnett v. Grattin,468 U.S. 42 (1984), that also involved the applicable
statute of limitations to a section 1981 discharge claim. The trial court dismissed the
section 1981 complaint of discharged white workers based on the application of a
state six-month statute of limitation. The court of appeals reversed and remanded.
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals and affirmed the reversal on the
grounds that the trial court had applied the wrong statute of limitations. Significantly,
all of the courts, including the Supreme Court, assumed that the dismissal of white
workers on the basis of race fell within section 1981. And, again, if discharges were
not within section 1981, the Court, presumably, would have affirmed the trial court
dismissal of the complaint on the alternative ground that the complaint failed to state
a claim. That it again, for the third time, was addressing the obviously complex issue
of statutes of limitations for discharge claims under section 1981 establishes that
section 1981 covered discharges.
65. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
66. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
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on the basis of his ethnic origins was racial discrimination that the
67
1866 Act remedied.
Thus, two cases specifically faced the issue of racially premised
discharges under section 1981, and in each case held that a claim
was stated. Four others assumed that section 1981 applied to discharges as the Court repeatedly wrestled with the application of the
appropriate statute of limitations applicable to such discrimination.
Given these holdings, it is not surprising that every circuit that has
decided the issue has recognized without dissent that racially premised discharges are within the protection of section 1981.68
To hold that discharges are not within the scope of section 1981,
the Court would have to reverse a long line of its own cases and
overturn the law in every circuit. Save for a lame attempt to explain
Goodman v. Lukens Steel, 69 the Court did not criticize, distinguish,
67. Again, as in Ricks, note 55, A1-Khazraji illustrates the conceptual difficulty
of distinguishing between the discharge of an employee and the refusal to retain that
employee for a future period of time. Did St. Francis College refuse to hire Mr. AlKhazraji, or did they discharge him? The answer is, they denied him a contract, and
such a denial states a section 1981 claim.
Soon after Al-Khazraji, Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987), addressed the harassment and discharge of a number of black employees represented
by a union. The issues before the Court were (1) the proper state statute of limitations and (2) union liability for its failure to file grievances on behalf of the employees harassed and discharged by the employer. In addressing the latter issue, the
Court assumed that the employer's discharge of the workers violated section 1981,
and held that the union, too, by its failure to file grievances on behalf of the employees,
using race as a factor in that decision, also violated section 1981. Moreover, and again,
for the fourth time the Court, assuming that section 1981 applied to discharges, analyzed the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to such discharges.
See also Johnson v. Chapel Hill Ind. School Dist., 853 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1988).
68. Hudson v. Souutheim Duictile CastingCorp., 849 F.2d 1372, 1375 (1 lth Cir.
1899); Manzanaresv. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979); Skinner v.
Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1988); Jurado v. ElevenFifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987); Banks v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 870
F.2d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989); Edwards v. Jewish Hospitalof St. Louis, 855 F.2d
1345 (8th Cir. 1988); Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1102, n.2 (8th
Cir. 1988); Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 834 F.2d 1373, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987);
Pricev. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988); Kelly v. TKY Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1198 (3d Cir. 1988); Taitt v. Chemical Bank, 849 F.2d
775, 777 (2d Cir. 1988); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 202 (1st Cir.
1987).
69. 482 U.S. 656 (1987). The Patterson Court explained Lukens Steel on the
grounds that the union's liability under section 1981 was its failure "to enforce" the
contract between the individual and the employer. Patterson,109 S. Ct. at 2373. First,
the union's failure was based on allegedly discriminatory job assignments and discharges by the employer. The Court assumed that the illegal conduct by the employer
triggered the union's duty to grieve the treatment. If the employer had not acted
illegally, the union's duty to protect the employee would have been less clear. Moreover, and more importantly, it is the enforcement of the union's contractual and legal
obligation to its members that serves as the basis of the union's section 1981 liability.
Any contractual right between the union and employer protecting employees against
racial discrimination is not between the union and the employer. It is the union that
enforces this contract right, and it is the alleged failure of the union that serves as

HeinOnline -- 6 Lab. Law. 197 1990

198

6

THE LABOR LAWYER

183 (1990)

or limit in any way this existing authority.7 0
The lower courts, therefore, continue to be bound by unreversed
Supreme Court authority unambiguously applying section 1981 to
racially premised discharges. They must assume that until that authority is reversed or limited by the Court, Patterson worked no
change in this aspect of section 1981.
This conclusion is confirmed by Jett v. DallasInd. School Dist.,"1
which was decided seven days after Patterson.The Court reviewed
a court of appeals' conclusion that local governmental bodies cannot
be liable under a theory of respondeat superior for their agents'
violations of the rights guaranteed by section 1981.72 A white football coach was removed from his coaching job by a school system
principal. The coach alleged that his removal and reassignment were
racially motivated, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He sued the
the basis for the union's liability to the employee. This liability has little to do with
whether or not the employer has breached a contract with the individual. Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor FreightInc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
The union's duty is an ongoing obligation of the union to the member. It is the breach
of this obligation between union and member on racial grounds that serves as the
basis of the union's section 1981 liability to the member, not, as Pattersonassumed,
whether the union is selectively enforcing the collective contract between the union
and the employer. Finally, this reasoning results in a paradox: an employer responsible for an employee's injury will not be liable for racially premised discharges under
section 1981, but the union is liable for its failure to protest these discharges. The
employer, which is primarily responsible for the employee's injury, would not have
to respond, while the union, which is only secondarily liable, would be solely liable
under section 1981 for the damages suffered by the employee. The union then becomes
the insurer of employer conduct. Such is hardly sound labor policy. See Vaca v. Sipes,
supra; Czosek v. O'Mara,397 U.S. 25 (1970); Bowen v. United States PostalService,
459 U.S. 212 (1983).
70. Indeed, the Court stated, "Neither our words nor our decisions should be
interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in the private, as well as the public, sphere." 109 S. Ct. at 2379. This emphasizes
the subsequent statement of the Court that "the Act simply does not cover the acts
of harassment alleged here." Id. (emphasis added). Such limiting language suggests,
therefore, a narrow application of the decision to the facts before it, and not a sweeping sub silentio reversal of established constructions of Congress' intent.
Moreover, the district court below had submitted the issue of discriminatory
discharge and promotion to the jury. The Fourth Circuit did not challenge the propriety of this action. 805 F.2d at 1143. While the Supreme Court did comment on what
it saw as an overstatement by the court of appeals on the protection for promotions,
109 S. Ct. at 237, conspicuously, the Court did not comment on the district court's
instruction as to racially premised discharge being a violation of section 1981. Given
the Court's comment on the promotion instruction, if the Court had found the discharge submission improper, it presumably would have given similar critical comment
regarding discharges. The Court's silence in this context thus suggests approval of
the lower court's submission of the discharge claim.
Finally, the dissent most certainly would have raised the discharge issue had they
read the majority as undermining well-established authority applying section 1981 to
discharges. The dissent's failure to raise a challenge on this issue suggests that no
change in existing law was proposed by the majority.
71. 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
72. Id. at 2709.
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school system. In resolving the issue presented, that section 1981
does not allow municipal liability premised on respondeat superior,
the Court noted that neither party even "raised the contention that
the substantive scope of the right.., to make ...contracts protected by section 1981 does not reach the injury suffered by petitioner here. ' 7 3 The Court proceeded to analyze the narrow respondeat
superiorissue, stating, "[W]e assume for the purpose of these cases,
without deciding, that petitioner's rights under section 1981 have
7' 4
been violated by his removal and reassignment.
While, of course, such a disclaimer allows the Court itself to
revisit the issue free from claims of stare decisis, until it does so,
the Court's continued application of section 1981 to discharges should
be binding on the lower courts. If the Supreme Court assumes, in
light of its holding in Patterson, that section 1981 is applicable to
discharges, the lower courts are not free to make a contrary assumption. Moreover, the Court's assumption is itself instructive in
that it seems relatively clear that if, in light of Patterson,a discharge
was no longer protected under section 1981, there would have been
no need for Jett to address the more narrow issue of respondeat
superior liability for that discharge. If Patterson had, in fact, resolved this issue-that discharge claims do not fall within section
1981-it is unlikely that the Court would have assumed the exact
75
opposite only one week later.
Wholly apart from this authority, analytically, discharges must
continue to be considered within the scope of section 1981. A termination, or discharge, is a way of articulating the employer's ex73. Id at 2709. This, of course, suggests that the parties and the lower court
simply assumed the obvious from existing law, that section 1981 reaches racially
premised discharges. They accepted this premise even with the Patterson decision
from the Fourth Circuit. Thus, even with the Pattersonholding by the Fourth Circuit
that harassment did not fall within section 1981, it was so well established that
discharges fall within section 1981 even defendant did not raise it, perhaps for fear
of incurring sanctions for litigating frivolous issues!
74. Id. at 2710.
75. See also Lytle v. Household Manufacturing,Inc., in which the plaintiff al-

leged a section 1981 claim for racially premised discharge. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a section 1981 claim. The Court granted
certiorari, presumably to resolve the issue of the collateral estoppel effect of a Title
VII dismissal on a section 1981 claim in regard to the petitioner's constitutional right
to a trial by jury. 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989). Perhaps, when it resolves the case, the Court
will use it as a vehicle to analyze further the scope of section 1981 and reverse
McDonald, AI-Khazraji, et al. But even if that is so, the grant of certiorari in Lytle

clearly indicates that Patterson itself does not hold that racially premised discharges
are outside the scope of section 1981. If Patterson held that section 1981 does not
reach racially premised discharges, the Court simply would have denied certiorari,
allowing the trial court's dismissal of the section 1981 claim to stand. At best, the
grant of certiorari suggests, as does Jett, that a discharge claim can be made under
section 1981. At worst, the grant of certiorari in Lytle suggests that Pattersondid not
resolve the issue.
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pressed refusal to offer a renewed contractual relationship. Or,
alternatively, depending on which party is deemed to be the offeror,
by "discharging" an employee the employer is refusing to accept the
employee's offer of continuing employment service. In short, and
however it is analyzed, the employer is doing nothing more, nothing
less, than refusing to contract further with the employee for the
employee's services. Therefore, even with Patterson'smyopic view
of the Act, when the employer refuses on the basis of race, to contract further for the employee's services by "discharging" the employee, section 1981 is violated. 76 Any attempt to distinguish in
contractual terms the refusal to hire and the discharge of a current
77
employee is futile.
An example will illustrate this futility. Assume that a discharged worker immediately reapplied for the very vacancy created
by his discharge. Of course, the discharged employee would be denied the position, based on the same reasons that motivated his
discharge. If the termination was racially motivated, a section 1981
claim has been created, because upon reapplication, the former employee (now as an applicant) would be directly and immediately
denied a contract because of race. Since the Court could not be requiring the terminated employee to take the futile step of applying
for the job from which he was discharged as a condition precedent
for a section 1981 claim, we must assume that the discharge itself
is treated as tantamount to a refusal to contract. The Court surely
would not deny the former employee a claim when he was rejected
for the vacancy on racial grounds, when a third party applying for
76. See Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d at 1102.
77. See DelawareState College v. Ricks, 479 U.S. 250 (1980), where a professor
was told that he was not going to be issued a contract for the next academic year.
This was treated as a discharge which took place, not as an indication that the contract
period had ended but as an indication that the teacher would not be employed, thus
triggering the statute of limitations period at the point of this notice, and not at the
end of the employment period. But the facts could have been construed as an announced refusal of the employer to tender an offer of employment. Either way it was
the refusal to contract which the Court correctly assumed to state a section 1981
claim.
See also Hishon v. King & Spalding,678 F.2d 1022, 1030 (dissent), rev'd 467 U.S.
69 (1984) (refusal to promote that results in termination is tantamount to discharge);
Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1988) (denial of tenure and
termination for failure to secure tenure are inseparable). See generally Johnson v.
Chapel Hill Ind. School Dist., 853 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1988). Nonetheless, at least one
court has made a distinction between hiring discrimination which is within the scope
of section 1981 and discharges, which are not. Greggs v. Hillman DistributingCo., 50
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 429 (S.D. Tex. 1989). See generally Carterv. Aselton, 50
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 633 (D.Colo. 1989). Contra Gamboa v. Washington, 50
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 524, 528 (N.D. Ill. 1989), that correctly recognizes that
Patterson does not alter the law regarding section 1981's application to racially motivated discharges. Accord English v. GeneralDevelopment Corp., 50 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 825 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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the same vacated position clearly would have a section 1981 claim
if he were rejected.
Moreover, assume the discharged worker was fired to allow employment of a white worker, and to fulfill its goal of hiring a white
worker the employer rejected another black applicant who also applied for the vacancy. The black applicant who was simply denied
a job will have a section 1981 claim, but if section 1981 does not
apply to discharges, the black employee who lost his job to create
the vacancy for the white worker will be without a section 1981
claim. Thus, the person most injured by this discrimination, the discharged employee, is the one denied a section 1981 remedy.
Finally, the failure to protect employees from racially motivated
terminations under section 1981 renders the protection granted to
employees entering an employment contract an extremely fragile
shell. The employer bent on discrimination could engage in ostensibly neutral hiring, followed by racially premised terminations, and
thus destroy any true ability of racial minorities to maintain a racially neutral contractual relationship. Congress could not have intended its guarantee of contractual equality granted in the 1866 Act
78
to be so fragile or so easily circumvented.
2. "Constructive Discharge": Indirect
Protection Against Harassment
We know from Patterson that section 1981 does not reach discrimination in the allocation of working conditions or the creation
of a hostile working environment. But if section 1981 reaches discharges, as it must, section 1981 must be applicable also to treatment
that is designed to force, and succeeds in forcing, an employee to
quit. Protection against direct discriminatory discharges is meaningless if an employer can avoid such prohibitions by the expedient

78. As is clear from its face, section 1981 is applicable to all contracts, not just
employment. Consequently, the refusal to enroll a student in a private school because
of race, similar to the refusal to hire, will state a section 1981 claim. Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). If Pattersonmakes section 1981 inapplicable to contract
terminations, presumably section 1981 would not apply to racially premised dismissals from schools. Thus, while a school could not refuse to enroll an applicant because
of race, the school would be free either to expel the student on racial grounds, or
more subtly, simply to deny reenrollment of the student for the next following school
term. Similarly, a lessor is required by the 1866 Act to rent property on a race-neutral
basis. See generally Jones v. AOred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Surely the Act
cannot be construed to allow the lessor, after leasing the property to the black tenant,
to evict the tenant on the grounds that termination is an unprotected "postcontractual" action.
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of simply driving the employee away.7 9 It is thus well established
that when an employer makes working conditions so intolerable that
the employee is forced to quit, the quitting will be treated as a "constructive discharge."8 0 There is no reason to believe that the logic
underlying the concept of indirect, or constructive, discharge is any
less valid under section 1981. When an employer desires to sever his
relationship with the employee on racial grounds and achieves this
result so that the employee cannot reasonably continue the relationship, it must be said that the employer has discharged the employee
as surely as if the employer had directly ordered the employee from
the premises. Stated somewhat differently but in more accurate contractual terms, if the employer harasses the employee for the purpose of causing the employee not to accept the pretextual offer of
continued employment, this should be treated as though the employer in fact refused to tender an offer of employment. The employer was tendering employment on such discriminatory terms that
the employee had no reasonable choice but to reject the offer.,"
While constructive discharge analysis has been broadly applied
under section 1981,82 two unique problems arise. The first is the
Court's holding in Patterson that simple harassment is not illegal
under section 1981. Under the majority and preferred Title VII analysis, if an employee quits in reasonable response to the illegal treatment, the employee's resignation is treated as a discharge, even if

79. Treating "constructive" termination of a relationship as an actual termination is an established principle of law. In the law of landlord and tenant, for example, it has long been established that a lessor who drives out a tenant by affirmative
acts designed to cause the tenant to vacate the premises will be deemed to have evicted
the tenant. American Law of Property, 279-83 (Casner, ed. 1952); Cribbet & Johnson,
Principles of the Law of Property 248-49 (3d Ed. 1989); Cunningham, Stoebuck &
Whitman, The Law of Property 296-98 (1984).
80. Levendos v. Stern Entertainment Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1988);
See generally Henson v. City ofDundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 lth Cir. 1982); Meyer v. Brown
& Root Const. Co., 661 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981); Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp.,
798 F.2d 559 (1st Cir. 1986); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th
Cir. 1987); Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 50 (6th Cir. 1985);
Bruhwiler v. University of Tennessee, 859 F.2d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 1988); Henry v.
Lennox Industries, Inc., 768 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
81. Cf. Leong v. Hilton Hotels, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 738 (D.C. Haw.
1989), which reasoned that since Patterson held that harassment does not state a
section 1981 claim, a constructive discharge claim based on harassment must likewise
be dismissed. Such reasoning is of course a non sequitur. Forcing an employee to sever
a contractual relationship is patently distinguishable from treating a person differently while maintaining a desire to continue the contractual relationship.
82. Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503 (1lth Cir. 1989); Lopez
v. S.B. Thomas, 831 F.2d 1184, 1188--89 (2d Cir. 1987); Maratin v. Citibank, N.A.,
762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985).
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the employer had no specific intent to cause the employee to quit.8
Under section 1981 when an employee quits in response to workplace
harassment, unlike under Title VII where such harassment is illegal,
the quitting employee will not be responding to treatment made illegal by this Act. The section 1981 plaintiff will not be entitled to a
remedy based solely on the fact that she was responding reasonably
to illegal treatment, but will have to prove illegal treatment apart
from the workplace discrimination. The second problem is that section 1981 liability is premised on proving a racial motivation for the
treatment.8 4 Thus, if the employer does not intend on racial grounds
to cause the employee to quit, the employer will not be liable. 5
There are thus two motivational elements plaintiff must prove
to establish a claim of constructive discharge under section 1981.
First, plaintiff must prove that defendant acted with the purpose of
causing the plaintiff to resign (or not to accept the offered employment). Second, plaintiff must prove that defendant was motivated
in its desire to cause plaintiff to resign (or reject the offer of employment) by racial considerations. Treatment without an intent to
cause the employee to quit, or treatment desiring the employee to
quit, but based on a nonracial reason, would not violate the Act.
The plaintiff should be aided in the quest of proving that the
employer intended the employee to quit by the evidentiary assumption that persons are presumed to intend the natural and foreseeable
consequences of their actions.8 6 Thus, if a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the harassment is that the worker would quit (or not
accept an offer of continued employment), we can infer from this

83. Id.; see particularly, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir.
1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) where the court stated: "[A]
number of cases, including one relied on by this court in Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d
1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981)] have rejected the notion that the employer must have the
specific intent of forcing the employee to quit. See, e.g., Davis v. Monsanto Chemical
Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988); Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885,888
(3d Cir. 1984); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982); Bourque v.
Powell ElectricalManufacturing Co., 617 F. 2d 61, 66 (6th Cir. 1980). These courts
instead held that it is sufficient if the employer simply tolerates discriminatory working conditions that would drive a reasonable person to resign. 825 F.2d at 472. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Court noted: "Price Waterhouse does not challenge the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the refusal to propose [plaintiff] for partnership amounted to a constructive discharge." 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1781 n.1 (1989); cf.
Johnsonv. BunnyBread Co., 646 F.2d 1250,1256(8th Cir. 1981); Coev. Yellow Freight
System Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 454 (10th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 663
F.2d 1268 (4th Cir. 1981), that suggest a requirement of a specific intent.
84. GeneralBuilding ContractorsAss'n v. Pennsylvania, 457 U.S. 375 (1982).
85. See Smith v. Cleburne County Hospital,870 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1989), where
alleged constructive discharge for exercise of free speech required proof of specific
intent.
86. NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963); Local 357, Teamsters v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961).
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that the employer intended that result.8 7 As the Court stated at one
time, "[I1t is discriminatory and it does discourage ... [I]t carries
with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw
but which he must have intended."88s
Plaintiffs are aided in proving the second element, that of racial
animus for the desired resignation, by the Court's discussion in Patterson. "We agree that racial harassment may be used as evidence
that a divergence in the explicit terms of particular contracts is
explained by racial animus."' 9 Thus, expressed animus or midcontractual treatment along racial lines will be strong evidence of the
employer's racial motive for the harassment.
If plaintiff succeeds in proving those two motivational elements-(1) desire that the employee quit and (2) racial basis for
this desire-plaintiff will have to establish, in addition, that the
quitting was a reasonable response to the employer's treatment. If
the employee's response is deemed unreasonable, the employee will
not be treated as though she were discharged. Minor or sporadic
insult would not reasonably cause one to quit her job, and thus would
not be considered as a discharge.90 Nonetheless, treatment need not
be onerous, particularly if laced with recurring racial insult, for a
pattern of treatment to reach a level where a person reasonably
would quit rather than continue to suffer. 91 Even single events of
serious discrimination can be considered constructive discharges. In
Price Waterhouse,92 for example, the refusal to promote an employee
was considered a constructive discharge.9 3 Similarly, a transfer to a
"dead end" position has been considered tantamount to a discharge,
warranting the employee's resignation.9 4 Forced participation in a
religious devotional service, which caused the employee to quit rather
9 5
than attend, was considered a discharge.
Perhaps even less harassment will suffice under section 1981
than is necessary to state a Title VII claim. One of the reasons a
significant level of harassment is required in the Title VII context
is that the employee has available a legal remedy under Title VII
87. See Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984). See also, Vance
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511, n.5 (11th Cir. 1989).
88. NLRB v. Erie Resistor, note 78, at 228.
89. 109 S. Ct. at 2376.
90. See, e.g., Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Heabney v. University of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981); Cazzola v. Codman & Shurtleff,
Inc., 751 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1984).
91. See, e.g., Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir.
1989); Levendos v. Stern Entertainment,Inc., 860 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1988).
92. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 472-73.
93. Accord Bruhwiler v. University of Tennessee, 859 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1988).
94. Parrettv. City of Connersville, 787 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1145 (1985).
95. Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
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that would stop the harassment. Thus, when the employee quits
rather then pursue the Title VII remedy, the question of the reasonableness of the employee's response is framed as to whether a reasonable person would have quit rather than seek available legal
redress. In light of the legal remedy alternative, it takes a significant
level of harassment to justify a person foregoing available legal remedies in favor of leaving her job. However, since Patterson holds
that an employee has no legal redress under section 1981 against
recurring harassment, the level of hostility that must be reached
before a reasonable person would quit-the victim having no recourse but to quit-should be lower than it would be in a Title'VII
96
context.
Thus, perhaps unbeknownst to the Court, the concept of constructive discharge should serve as an indirect method by which
harassment will continue to be remedied.97 In reality, therefore, perhaps the only persons adversely affected by Pattersonwill be those
employees who do not respond to the harassment by terminating
their employment.98
D. Compensation
Prior to Pattersonclaims addressing discriminatory salary adjustments, raises, bonuses, etc., were rountinely recognized as being
96. Plaintiff must prove also that she in fact quit in response to the treatment,
and not for unrelated personal reasons. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 90708.
97. See Vancev. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d at 1503, where the issue
was whether plaintiff demonstrated sufficient racial harassment to justify a jury
finding that the plaintiff had been constructively discharged because of his race. The
employer, citing the Fourth Circuit decision in Patterson, argued that plaintiff failed
to state a claim when the claim ultimately was based on harassment. The court rejected
this argument and distinguished Pattersonas a "pure" harassment case, which would
not control where the harassment rose to the level of being a constructive discharge.
The court reasoned that harassment causing a person to stop working is impairing
the ability to make and enforce her employment contract. 863 F.2d at 1509, n.3 Accord,
Gamboav. Washington, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 528 (post-Pattersonholding
that harassment amounting to a demotion or constructive discharge states a section
1981 claim). Contra, Leong v. Hilton Hotels, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 738 (D.
Haw. 1989).
98. Id. This, in turn, suggests the silliness in excluding harassment itself from
the scope of the Act. For reasons set forth above, protection against hiring discrimination requires protection against discriminatory discharge. Otherwise an employer
could avoid liability by hiring and immediately firing the employee. If discharges are
protected, it follows that the Act must also protect against constructive discharges.
If constructive discharge is not within the scope of section 1981, the employer, unable
to fire the employee on racial grounds, would simply hound and harass the employee
into quitting. Therefore, the protection against hiring discrimination, as well as the
protection against direct discharges, would be rendered meaningless unless forced
quits are recognized as being within the Act. Consequently, if harassment reaches the
level where the employee is forced to quit she will have a remedy if she quits. However,
the employee can secure no remedy if she remains on the job and endures the insult.
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within the scope of section 1981. 99 By its analysis Pattersonraises
doubt as to whether this established law has been undermined.
Clearly, if at the time of the initial employment the employer sets a
wage lower because of the race of the new employee, that would be
offering employment on racially discriminatory terms, thus creating
a section 1981 claim.100 However, if thereafter, the employer does
not raise the wages of black workers, while granting white workers
raises, or grants bonuses to whites but none to blacks, the reasoning
of the Court suggests that the black workers may have no claim
because this would be mere "postcontractual" discrimination. The
Court made no such express holding; it did not even mention wages.
Nonetheless, one of the elements of plaintiff's alleged harassment
had been pay discrimination. Moreover, denying a remedy to compensation discrimination could be a natural product of the Court's
simplistic view of the contractual relationship between employers
and employees, that so long as the employee had the same job and
did not undertake a totally new and different job, any midterm treatment is beyond the reach of section 1981.101
However, as pointed out above, the correct view of the indefinite
employer-employee relationship is that each working or pay period
is implicitly a new job offer to be accepted or rejected by the employee commencing work. 10 2 The employer is not required to tender
the offer for employment into the new work period, and, if offered,
the employee need not accept it. But when the job is tendered and
accepted, a new contract is formed for the period set by the parties,
even if compensation and the nature of the job being performed
03
remain largely unchanged.
With this in mind it is important to remember that compensation
is the consideration for the employee's performance of service, and
99. See, e.g., Beeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 834 F.2d 1373, 1378 (7th Cir.
1987); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 202 (1st Cir. 1987); Carter v.
Duncan-Huggins,Ltd., 729 F.2d 1225, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Inland Marine
Industries, 729 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
100. 109 S. Ct. at 2372, 2376.
101. Particularly, the Court's discussion of whether a denial of a promotion
states a section 1981 claim suggests a result that would deny claims to salary adjustments. In the context of discussing promotions, the Court indicated that merely blocking a normal upward progression, as opposed to refusing a "new and distinct relation,"
would not be actionable. See 109 S. Ct. at 2377. Thus, applying these criteria to interim
wage adjustments, one could argue that simply failing to grant a pay increase to a
single individual does not state a section 1981 claim.
102. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
103. Indeed this concept of each period representing a distinct obligation is
imposed by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, where minimum wage
and overtime obligations must be calculated by the employer on a weekly basis, The
mere fact that the employer paid over the minimum in one week is not offset against
underpayment in subsequent weeks. Each week creates a new and distinct obligation.
See Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
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thus is a key and central component to the contractual relationship.
When the consideration for the requested performance is to be altered, as a pay increase or decrease would be, this necessarily requires a new contractual relationship between the parties; changing
the obligation is not accomplished by a unilateral announcement. 104
When new wages are proposed by the employer, the employee must
accept this offer or no contract will be formed. When they are proposed and the employee accepts the new offer by commencing the
performance of services, there is a new and different relationship
between the parties. The employee now has a contractual right to
claim this different amount, something the employee could not have
claimed prior to the wage adjustment. If the new wages are premised
on the race of the worker, then this is a racially premised contract,
regardless of the fact that six months or a year ago, when the employment relationship was first commenced, the compensation was
not racially premised. This contract for the upcoming contractual
period, proposing new and different consideration, is a new contract,
and as a new contract is subject to the guarantees of section 1981.
Perhaps an example will illustrate this point. Assume that a
current employee requests an increase in pay. This request for a pay
raise can be construed in contract terms as an offer for a different
employment contract on terms differing from those currently governing the relationship of the parties. If the employer accepts the
offer a new contract is formed. But if the employer rejects the offer
by restating the current pay as the proposed consideration for the
employee's service, or if the employer proposes a compromise salary,
e.g., an increase over the current salary but one less than proposed
by the employee, this response by the employer would be a counteroffer, to be accepted or rejected by the employee. Regardless of the
form of the employer's response (rejection or counteroffer), if the
employer proposes compensation on racial grounds, this constitutes
offering a contract to the employee on racially discriminatory
grounds, or refusing to contract with the plaintiff on the basis of
race. Either way it should violate section 1981.105
104. For example, if the employee decided that he wanted to work a thirty-fivehour week rather than the understood forty-hour week, he would have to tender this
proposal to the employer for acceptance. He could not simply unilaterally refuse to
work. Similarly, if the employer wants to decrease, or increase, wages the proposal
is made to the employee, who is free to accept the proposed modification or reject it
by refusing to work.
105. Alternatively, the request by the employee for a pay increase might be
construed as a proposal, or a request for an offer from the employer, as opposed to
a formal contractual offer. The employer's reaction would thus be to either make the
requested offer, which would. be accepted by the employee, or to refuse to make the
offer. In either case there has been a refusal to contract, and the result should not
depend upon which party can be identified as the offeror.
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The same result should be reached if the employer fails to raise
the wages of black workers while granting wage increases, through
new contracts, to white workers. When an employer, without a request, unilaterally elects to offer an increased salary to white workers but elects not to offer a similar increase to the black plaintiff,
and these contractual decisions are premised on the race of the employees, then this failure to make a contractual offer to black workers would be a failure to grant the black workers "the same right to
make contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens." White employees
are being given contractual offers not tendered to black employees,
with the failure to make these contractual offers being based on
race. Making or withholding offers on racial grounds cannot be construed as the "same right to make a contract" as is accorded white
06
citizens. 1
E. Retaliation
1. Generally
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits retaliation against an employee for participating in Title VII proceedings and for opposing practices made illegal by Title VII. 0 7 The 1866
Civil Rights Act has no similar provision. Nonetheless, the courts
have uniformly accepted the proposition that if an employer takes
an adverse employment action because the employee has complained
about, or filed charges of, racial discrimination, the employment
action is sufficiently premised on "race" to allow a claim under
section 1981.108 Patterson did not undermine this established law.
The uniform assumption remains unchallenged that retaliation
against racial discrimination complaints is itself a form of "racial"
discrimination within the reach of section 1981.

106. See Bazemore v. Friday,478 U.S. 385, 394-97 (1986).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) provides in part, "[ilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this
title." For a summary see, Player, Employment DiscriminationLaw 269-78 (1988).
108. Skinner v. Total Petroleum,859 F.2d 1439, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1988); Londonv. Coopers & Lybrand,644 F.2d 811,818 (9th Cir. 1981); Collins v. State of Illinois,
830 F.2d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 1987); Breeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 834 F.2d at
1378; Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1146 (8th Cir. 1981); Rowlett
v. Anheuser-Busch, 832 F.2d 194, 202 (8th Cir. 1987); Choudhury v. Polytechnic Institute of N.Y., 735 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1984); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard,678 F.2d
1211, 1229 n.15 (5th Cir. Unit B. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Goff v.
Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1982).
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2. Participation in Proceedings:
Protecting the Right "to Enforce"
In rejecting the application of the "to enforce" clause of section
1981 to discrimination in the application of an existing contract,
Pattersonconstrued the "to enforce" provision of section 1981 to
cover "wholly private efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes ...."109 Therefore, if an employer reacts to an 'employee's filing of a legal or
administrative proceeding charging race discrimination by making
a discriminatory job assignment, reducing the employee's pay, engaging in harassment, or by discharging the employee, the employer
would be denying to the employee freedom "to enforce" the contract
by "impeding access to the courts or obstructing nonjudicial methods
of adjudicating disputes." The broad language of the Court would
protect against employer impediments, the filing of charges with
any entity that could adjudicate the alleged race discrimination, such
as filing a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, ironically, while it does not violate section 1981 to harass
an employee because of his race, if the employee files a formal complaint with an enforcing agency, public or private, or a grievance
under a collective bargaining agreement challenging that harassment, and the employer, in turn, harasses the employee for filing
the complaint, a section 1981 complaint will lie. 10
Pattersonwill also allow a section 1981 claim when an employer
retaliates against a former employee by giving the former employee
poor references, thus inhibiting the plaintiff's ability to enter an
employment contract with another employer. Not only will such conduct deny the plaintiff the ability "to enter" a contract,"' it will
also interfere with the "enforcement" of its rights by punishing such
enforcement.

109. 109 S. Ct. at 2373 (emphasis in original).
110. See Jordanv. U.S. West Direct Co., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 633, 635
(D. Colo. 1989), which held, inexplicably, that while a demotion based on race did not
state a section 1981 claim, demotion because the employee complained of discrimination and instigated an investigation of his charges does state a section 1981 claim.
This underlines, again, the utter silliness of the Patterson holding. Contrast, English
v. General Development Corp., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
The conduct complained of need not in fact be in violation of the statute. The
filing of charges will be protected against employer retaliation regardless of the outcome of the initial charge. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th
Cir. 1969); Hicks v. ABTAss'n Inc., 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978). See Bill Johnson's
Restaurants Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 53 (1983).
111. London v.Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 1981).
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3. Informal Opposition: Back to the
"To Make" Clause
Where Pattersonmay work a change is in retaliation premised
on mere opposition to racial practices, as opposed to filing enforcement proceedings. Such discrimination is racial, no doubt, but since
the employee is not being punished for "enforcement" of the right,
and by this interfere with enforcement, the "to enforce" clause presumably is not invoked. The Court emphasized that the "to enforce"
provision applied only to "methods of adjudicating disputes about
the force of binding obligations....1112 Thus, while invoking contractual grievance arbitration or filing state administrative EEO
charges would be steps for "adjudicating disputes," and thus protected by the Court's analysis, mere informal objections to the employer, to fellow employees, or to outsiders about the perceived racial
discrimination practiced by the employer do not utilize an accepted
method of resolving the dispute concerning "the force of binding
13
obligations."'
Protection of informal opposition, therefore, must come solely
from the "to make" clause of section 1981, and that protection will
be subject to all the constraints of the Patterson analysis. Section
1981 would clearly apply to an employer's refusal to hire someone
because of prior racial protests, and would appear to prohibit this
employer from interfering with the plaintiff's ability to contract
elsewhere.' 1 4 Likewise, Pattersonshould not undermine the applicability of section 1981 to promotions, because a promotion necessarily
is a new contractual undertaking. Consequently, if an employer were
to refuse to promote the employee based on prior objections to discrimination, this -would fall within the "to make" protections of
section 1981.
Patterson'sanalysis, hopefully, will not be used to undermine
the traditional section 1981 protection for racially discriminatory
112. 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
113. Thus, if the employer and union have a collective bargaining agreement,
filing a grievance under that contract would be attempting "to enforce" contractual
obligations, and thus be fully protected against employer retaliation. However, if the
employer is nonunion and has no collective agreement, filing an identical protest with
the employer, pleading with the employer's personnel department, or invoking internal grievance machinery, asking the employer to obey his legal obligations, is not
protected by the "to enforce" clause; the employee is not seeking a binding interpretation of the contract. Difference in protection is based on whether the employer is
or is not unionized!
114. See Pinkardv. Pullman-Standard,678 F.2d 1211, 1229 n.15 (5th Cir. Unit
B. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983) ("A claim under section 1981 may be
based upon retaliatory action taken against an employee for the employee's lawful
advocacy of the rights of racial minorities.") See also Caldwell v. National Brewing
Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972). Accord, London
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d at 818.
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discharges. 115 Consequently, it will continue to violate section 1981
to discharge an employee because of reasonable protests ' 6 of racial
7
discrimination."'
However, if section 1981 no longer reaches pay discrimination,
an employer will not be violating this Act by reducing the pay of an
employee because the employee objected to the racial discrimination
of the employer. Consequently, if pay discrimination is not protected
by section 1981 and the employee complains about perceived pay
differences, the employer can retaliate by further reductions in pay.
Finally, and this is almost unbelievable-but given the holding in
Pattersonit is unavoidable-because section 1981 does not protect
harassment, if an employee informally raises racial discrimination
issues with the employer, or engages in a peaceful protest against
such treatment, the employer will not violate section 1981 by undertaking a program of retaliatory harassment against the employee.
Only if the employee quits in response to the harassment, thus setting up a possible claim for constructive discharge, will the employee
have any chance for section 1981 relief.
Now consider the results. If an employee were to file a racial
discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), a state EEO office, a state or federal court, or
even a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement, the employee would be protected against all forms of retaliation-including
harassment-by the "to enforce" provision of section 1981. But by
raising the same objection informally in the hope of securing informal redress, the employee is vulnerable to on the job harassment
that cannot be remedied under section 1981.
This last distinction, as well as the entire Patterson decision,
defies logic, basic contract principles, and sound public policy. One
would hope, and perhaps assume, that Pattersonis a decision that
115. For a discussion of the application of section 1981 to discharges, see notes
60-78 and accompanying text.
116. Protests must be "reasonable" in light of the employee's assigned duties.
Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundationfor Experimental Biology, Inc., 545 F.2d 222 (1st
Cir. 1976); Poddar v. Youngstown State University, 480 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1973).

Protests must not violate state tort law and must not incite others to violate the law.
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d at 341, rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). The employee's protests must be temperate and refrain from attacking
the products or services of the employer. Pendeltonv. Rumsfeld, 628 F.2d 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1983).

117. Jordanv. U.S. West Co., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 635. This underscores the need to have section 1981 apply to discharges. The protection against
retaliation would be meaningless if the employer could fire an employee because the
employee objected to the employer concerning perceived racial discrimination. Yet, if
the Court were to hold that section 1981 does not protect against discharges, this
would be the result. An employee who files a formal charge of racial discrimination
would be protected against retaliatory discharge. An employee who wrote a letter to
his employer seeking a peaceful resolution of the issue would be vulnerable.
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will not stand the test of time, and upon further reflection it will be
repudiated. Certainly, one would hope that the lower courts will
apply this case no further than its precise holding.
IV. Conclusion
In Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union, the civil rights movement
dodged the proverbial bullet when the Court elected not to overturn
Runyon v. McCrary," s which had allowed section 1981 contract actions against private persons without any requirement of "state action." But by denying section 1981 protection to victims of racial
harassment, the opinion appears at first glance, as Justice Brennan
alleges in dissent, to have taken away with one hand what it refused
to snatch away with the other." 9 That prediction was unnecessarily
dire. 20 While the majority's holding is premised on what can be
charitably described as a crabbed view of section 1981, a myopic
reading of the legislative history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and
an unsophisticated vision of the contractual relationship between
an employee and employer, there is no reason that such an analysis,
with its multitude of faults, will be or even can be, applied beyond
the narrow holding of the Court.
Clearly, all racially premised hiring decisions remain within section 1981, as should, notwithstanding the Court's hesitancy, virtually all promotion decisions. Similarly, because discharges are
merely a way of expressing a refusal of the employer to contract
with the employee, it would seem that even with the Court's pinched
analysis, section 1981 continues to protect racially premised discharges. Moreover, because the Court has repeatedly held and assumed that racially premised discharges state a claim under section
1981, until that authority is overruled, it remains binding on the
lower courts.
As discharges continue to be protected by section 1981, plaintiffs who quit in response to the employer's racial harassment seeking to drive them away should continue to have the traditional remedy
for a constructive discharge, provided that the quitting employee
can establish not only the reasonableness of his decision to quit, but
also the subjective elements of the employer's specific purpose to
cause the employee to quit and a racial motivation behind that purpose.
The Court conceded that initial discriminatory pay rates and
118. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
119. 109 S. Ct. at 2379 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
120. Indeed, such gloom and doom statements often contribute to lower courts
expanding the majority decision far beyond what even the language or logic of the
opinion will carry. See, e.g., Greggs v. Hillman Dist. Co., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 429 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
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segregated job assignments continue to be proscribed by section 1981.
And if logic were to be followed, the Act would continue to cover,
as it has in the past, discriminatory alteration of pay rates. Correctly
viewed, each new pay period is a new contract, which if offered on
racially discriminatory terms states a section 1981 claim.
Retaliation claims, save those based on harassment and perhaps
salary differences, in response to mere opposition, should not be
undermined by the Patterson decision. Indeed, the Court's analysis
of "to enforce" strengthens the theoretical ability of plaintiffs to
protect against all forms of retaliation, including salary and harassment, based upon the employee's filing of formal enforcement actions.
What, then, did Pattersonchange? Very little, at least for now.
Only posthiring alteration of working conditions not amounting to
constructive discharges are clearly excluded from the scope of section 1981. The danger of Pattersonis that the lower courts will read
too much into the holding, perhaps encouraged by well-intended but
uninformed statements in the popular press, that Pattersonundermined virtually all claims under section 1981. We must hope, even
if we cannot assume, that lower courts will have a sounder understanding of the employment relationship than did the Supreme Court,
and will not apply Patterson'swilted notions of contract law beyond
the narrow confines of the Court's holding.
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